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Abstract 
The role of oil: its output and infrastructure and technology in the world are established. Exploration and 
Exploitation of oil is not only significant as a revenue generator but has become indispensible in the world 
economy especially as a result of the inability of world economy to find a better substitute. The recent decline 
and fluctuation arising from oil sector over the decades have prompted a reassessment of petroleum fiscal 
systems. The research compares the current upstream fiscal systems of three oil exporting countries: Nigeria, 
Indonesia and Malaysia. The approach adopted for this study is a review of the existing literature on fiscal 
regimes; the focus is an objective presentation of empirical evidence. The methodology involved desktop 
research which looked into published literature. Based on the evaluation, the paper arrived at possible 
conclusions and implications for oil fiscal regimes for the respective countries and the world fiscal systems in 
general. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
* Corresponding author.  
E-mail address: babajidenathaniel@yahoo.com. 
 
99 
 
 
International Journal of Sciences: Basic and Applied Research (IJSBAR)(2014) Volume 15, No  2, pp 99-115 
 
Keywords: Exploitation; Exploration; Fiscal systems; and Upstream 
1. Introduction  
The impact of oil on the world economy since its discovery in 18th century cannot be overemphasized; 
compared to other sectors of the economy the oil industry has special attention which stems from the fact that it 
has continuously sustained other sectors of the economy by providing world energy not only for agriculture and 
transportation [1] but has specially become a source of revenue for most oil exporting countries in developed 
countries and less developing one in particular. The quest for oil exploration was only carried out by small 
number of companies until after the 1960; there now exists more than 300 oil companies exploring oil in two or 
more countries; also exploration by private multinational oil companies occur in more than 150 countries in the 
world. Exploration and exploitation of petroleum occurs on the basis of contracts, leases and concessions 
granted by government of respective countries based on the established law [2]. Thus in the oil industry whether 
of private or public companies ‘fiscal regimes’ have become fundamental aspects of exploration and 
exploitation contracts; it is described as a key factor in decision making both by host government, stakeholders 
and investors. 
Fiscal system refers to “all the payments to government required under a petroleum arrangement”; according to 
[3] it is defined as the “framework which the government of an oil producing country employs in managing, 
regulating and sharing the revenues that accrue from the stages of exploitation”. It includes bonuses, royalties, 
corporate income taxes and other special taxes. A country’s fiscal system represents the mechanisms “by which 
the host government can capture the economic rent from the exploitation of the petroleum resource”[1]. This has 
profound implications: design of the optimal fiscal system has a direct bearing on macroeconomic indicators 
such as fiscal and trade balance as the constitutes up to 20% of revenue to developed countries government and 
make up a huge chunk of up to 83% of government revenue in less developed countries. Besides, fiscal model 
do not only impact a country’s exploration and exploitation activities but also the ability of a country to replace 
reserve [4].  
Furthermore, it has been stated that fiscal regimes have been responsible for the massive fluctuation that have 
become common in the world oil industry. The urge to get as much revenue as possible from a “non-renewable 
patrimonial resource” has not only led to the evolvement of varying petroleum fiscal systems but has seen many 
countries fiddle with one fiscal regime for petroleum after another [1]. In some countries there are various fiscal 
systems for different activities in the oil sector while in some other countries “a single fiscal system applies to 
the entire country” [2]. There are currently more than 226 fiscal systems for 144 petroleum exporting countries. 
Based on the above the aim of this paper is to evaluate the different petroleum fiscal systems in the World Oil 
Industry while looking ineptly at the petroleum fiscal systems of three oil exporting countries. A comparative 
analysis would show the varying fiscal stance of the different countries; this paper will examine the countries 
experience in developing their upstream sector; patterns of different fiscal system adopted. This paper also gives 
an insight into the contract terms of one country relative to the others for given set of fiscal regimes thereby 
generating possible policy implications and thus suggestion for ‘reasonable’ actions. 
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The objectives of the study are: (I) to review worlds fiscal regimes while benchmarking its impact against key 
features of importance to host government and oil contractors, (ii) to review individual countries current 
upstream fiscal regimes; and (iii) to provide a comparative examination of three oil exporting countries fiscal 
regimes. The research covers fiscal systems in general and trickle down to fiscal systems of three oil exporting 
countries: Malaysia, Nigeria and Indonesia. It will cover history, trends, patterns and fiscal systems of oil and 
gas industry in general and of the three countries in particular. 
The rest of this paper would be as follows: section two outlines the individual countries fiscal systems; section 
three presents a comparative assessment of the three oil exporting countries earmarked for this study focusing 
on their capture of rents and government take, cost containment and cost recovery provisions, avoidance of 
revenue leakage, income and profit tax provisions and administrative simplicity. Summary, implications and 
conclusion follow in section four.  
2. Upstream Fiscal Systems in Oil Producing Countries 
Researchers, academicians and professionals have over the decades paid maximum attention to fiscal systems 
and its attendant variables on the economics of non-renewable resource exploitation. According to [4], 
petroleum fiscal systems do not only determine decision making by investors and government but also set the 
tune by which costs are recovered and profits shared equitably. Table 1 shows the degree of various fiscal 
systems in the world. 
Table 1.Fiscal Systems in Major Oil Producing Areas 
Fiscal Systems Countries 
Very Favourable Ireland, Spain, United Kingdom, Argentina, New Zealand, 
Pakistan (Zone 1) And Denmark (Fourth Round) 
Favourable Northwest Territories (Canada), Illinois, Peru, Australia 
(Offshore) And United States Shelf (Gulf Of Mexico, Deep) 
Average The Philippines, United States Outer Continental Shelf (Gulf Of 
Mexico, Shallow), Thailand (Gulf, 1995 Terms), China 
(Offshore), Malaysia (Deep Water) Nigeria (Offshore To 200 
Meters), Vietnam And Trinidad And Tobago (Onshore) 
Tough Kazakhstan, Alaska (Onshore), Ecuador (Regular Terms), Texas 
(Offshore), Alberta (Third-Tier Oil), Netherlands (1995 Terms), 
Norway And India. 
Very Tough Louisiana, Russia (Production Sharing Contracts), Venezuela 
(New Model Contract), Indonesia (1994 Terms), Malaysia 
(Conventional), Angola, Nigeria (Niger Delta), Syria And 
Yemen. 
Source: Culled from [2] 
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2.1 Malaysia 
2.1.1 Country and Industry Overview 
Malaysia is a federal constitutional monarchy found in Southeast Asia. Is consists of thirteen states and federal 
territories and has a landmass of 329,847 square kilometres separated by the South China Sea into two similarly 
sized regions: peninsular Malaysia and Malaysian Bornea [5]. Malaysia shares its border with Singapore, 
Vietnam and the Philippine. As a Maritime nation, Malaysia has one of the largest continental shelve and a 
distance of 200 nautical miles of exclusive economic zone. Malaysia is surrounded by many seas; these seas are 
not only important to Malaysia only in terms of tourism and livelihood but they are also rich in various 
resources including the most economically valuable: oil and gas [6]. 
Malaysia’s first discovery non-renewable resource exploitation started with the discovery of crude petroleum in 
1910, when Shell discovered crude on Canada Hill in Miri, Sakawa; Shell Miri No. 1 was studded on August 10 
in the same year, and began producing 83 barrels per day (bbls/d)) in December 1910 of the same year. 
However, the same oil well ‘Grad Oil Lady’ as is affectionately refereed to have now become a state monument. 
Today Malaysia has approximately 615,100 square kilometres of acreages available for Oil and Gas 
Explorations. Petroleum exploration in Malaysia is made up of a combination of shelfal shallow waters as well 
as deepwater environments [6]. The first deepwater discovery was Murphy Oil in 2002, the 440 million barrels 
Kikeh area, lies in around 1,340 meters in offshore Sabah. In terms of licensing, over 50 new licenses have been 
signed since 1996 as a number of new companies have entered the Malaysian upstream arena, which has 
increased the level of diversity of operatorship. 
The oil and gas industry in Malaysia is divided into Upstream, midstream and downstream activities. The 
upstream activities are made up of exploration, development and production of oil and gas; the midstream and 
downstream boast of a combination of transportation (tanker and pipelines), refining and processing, through to 
marketing and trading of end products [6].Oil and gas Industry/sector contributed 20% to the overall Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) [7]; of these upstream petroleum sector accounts for 78.38% with a total contribution 
of RM87 while the downstream sector with a total of RM24 contributes only 21.62% in the last decade, growth 
in the upstream sector of Malaysia has been driven more by rising prices in oil and gas than by increased in 
production. Nearly all of Malaysia’s oil comes from offshore field. The continental shelf is divided into three 
producing basins: the Malay basin in the west and the Sarawak and Sabah basins in the east [6]. 
The major player in the Malaysian oil and gas sector is country’s national oil corporation called PETRONAS 
which plays a major role in driving the industry’s growth through its development of oil and gas resources as 
well as the creation of opportunities for local companies to build up capacity and capability across the value 
chain. PETRONAS is made up of two unit: PETONAS’ Petroleum Management Unit regulates upstream 
activities, while PETRONAS’ Subsidiary PETRONAS Carigali participates in production sharing contracts with 
other PSC contractors made majorly of Huge Multinational Corporations. The Malaysian government aims to 
increase aggregate production capacity of 5 percent per year up to 2020 to meet domestic demand growth and to 
sustain crude oil and LNG export markets [8]. 
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Table 2: Production of Oil in Malaysia: 1980-2011 
Year Production % Change 
1980 283 NA 
1981 264 -6.71 
1982 306 15.91 
1983 365 19.28 
1984 440 20.55 
1985 440 0.00 
1986 504 14.55 
1987 497 -1.39 
1988 540 8.65 
1989 585 8.33 
1990 619 5.81 
1991 646 4.36 
1992 653.39 1.14 
1993 640 -2.05 
1994 644.99 0.78 
1995 682.49 5.82 
1996 695.03 1.84 
1997 700 0.72 
1998 720 2.86 
1999 693 -3.75 
2000 690.03 -0.43 
2001 659.21 -4.47 
2002 698.46 5.95 
2003 737.86 5.64 
2004 755.35 2.37 
2005 631.07 -16.45 
2006 612.6 -2.93 
2007 588.22 -3.98 
2008 608.8 3.50 
2009 577.87 -5.08 
2010 553.96 -4.14 
2011 507.78 -8.34 
Source:Authors’ Compilation from [8] 
Malaysian Oil production peaked in the mid 1990s approximately 600,000 barrels per day, as shown in Table 2. 
This was due to the normal maturation of the traditional shelf basins which means that most of the economically 
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attractive fields are likely to have been found and developed and new discoveries are more likely to be smaller 
and more demanding than those developed earlier. Total oil production in 2011 was an estimated 507,000 
barrels per day, compared with 553,000 in 2010, of which about 83% was crude oil [8]. Without significant 
efforts being made in the upstream exploration, development and production via enhanced oil recovery, 
innovative approaches to the development of small fields, or through intensification exploration activities to 
achieve a faster pace of oil and gas discoveries, oil and gas production in Malaysia is expected to decline by 1 to 
2 percent per year on average in the coming decades [6] as shown in the diagram below. 
Figure 1: Trend Analysis of Malaysian Production 
 
Source:Authors’ Compilation from [8] 
 
2.1.2 Malaysian Petroleum Fiscal System 
Malaysia carries out its exploration, development and production activities through its National Oil Company, 
PETRONAS through Production Sharing Contracts (PSC) governed by the Malaysian Petroleum Act of 1967 
and Petroleum Income Tax Amendment Act of 1976. Of the 615,100 square meters of land available for 
petroleum exploration 218,678 square metres which makes up 36% of the total acreages are currently covered 
by PSCs. Exploration and exploitation activities based on the PSCs have led to the discovery of 163 oil fields 
and 216 gas fields [6].  
In 1997, a new PSC based on the “revenue over cost” concept was introduced to encourage additional 
investment in Malaysia’s upstream sector. The RC/PSC as tagged allows contractors to accelerate their cost 
recovery if the contractors achieved certain cost targets [9]. The major aim of the RC/PSC is to fulfil the terms 
of an ideal fiscal regime that give maximum revenue to government while still encouraging investment by 
allowing the PSC contractors a higher share of production when the contractor’s profitability falls and increase 
PETRONAS’s share of production when profitability is high. This is measured by an “R/C index£ which is the 
ratio of contractor’s cumulative revenue over contractor’s cumulative costs. Details of the Malaysian fiscal 
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terms are described in the following table: 
Table 3: Overview of Malaysian Fiscal Regime 
Fiscal Term Main Features 
Royalty 10% 
Petroleum Income Tax 38% 
Export duty (oil and condensate) 10% 
Research levy 0.5% (not inclusive in cost oil or cost gas) 
PETRONAS Carigali’s Participation 20% 
Exploration Period 5 years 
Gas Holding Period 5 years 
Development Period 4 years 
Production Period 20 years 
  
R/C index Total cost tranche (TCT) Total Profit tranche 
(TCT) 
0.0 to 1.0 70% 20% 
1.0 to 1.4 60% 30% 
1.4 to 2.0 50% 40% 
2.0 to 2.5 30% 60% 
2.5 to 3.0 30% 60% 
> 3.0 30% 60% 
Below threshold volume (THV)* 
R/C index Contractors share of unused 
TCT 
Contractors share of 
TPT 
0.0 to 1.0 - 80% 
1.0 to 1.4 80% 70% 
1.4 to 2.0 70% 60% 
2.0 to 2.5 60% 50% 
2.5 to 3.0 50% 40% 
> 3.0 40% 30% 
Below threshold volume (THV)* 
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R/C index Contractors share of unused 
TCT 
Contractors share of 
TPT 
0.0 to 1.0 - 40% 
1.0 to 1.4 40% 30% 
1.4 to 2.0 40% 30% 
2.0 to 2.5 40% 30% 
2.5 to 3.0 40% 30% 
> 3.0 20% 10% 
 
Source: Adapted from [8]: Putrohari et al, 2007 
2.2 Nigeria 
2.2.1 Overview and Oil and Gas Industry 
Besides being the most populous black nation with an estimated population 158 million people and a land mass 
spanning; Nigeria is the largest producer of crude petroleum in Africa and as at 2010 the 10th largest producer in 
the world with an estimated production rate of 2,458,000 barrels per day [5]. The Oil and Gas Industry is 
significant to the nation’s economy as it constitutes over 90% of Nigeria’s foreign exchange earnings and 83% 
of its Gross Domestic Product [3]. 
History records that exploration for oil and gas began in 1908 in Lagos and Okitipupa coastal area in Western 
Nigeria by the Nigerian Bitumen Company owned by a German Consortium; between 1905 and 1956, various 
exploration activities were carried out in the various parts of the country. The first discovery of the crude 
petroleum was with the discovery of oil in Oliobiri in the then Rivers states, now Bayelsa State by Shell D’Arcy. 
The exploration of oil and gas is concentrated in Niger Delta region which constitutes 6 states out of the 36 
states of the federation where both indigenous and multinational companies are engaged in the exploration and 
exploitation of oil [10]. 
The Nigerian oil and gas industry constitutes upstream, downstream and service sectors. The upstream sector 
comprises mining, exploration and production; the downstream is mainly involved in refining of crude oil into 
usable products through distillation, conversion and other special treatments to derive oil and gas products as 
well as distribution of products; finally the service sector provides technical and consultancy service to aid the 
upstream sector in drilling, exploration and production activities [3].The major players in the Nigerian oil and 
gas industry are the Nigerian Government whose main focus is in the upstream sector and whose activities are 
mainly controlled and coordinated mainly by the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) with other 
attendants ministries: the department of petroleum resources (DPR) (regulatory agency for oil and gas 
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activities); The Ministry of Energy (MOE); The Federal Ministry of Environment (FME) and the Federal Inland 
Revenue Service (FIRS) and the Niger Delta Development Commission (NNDC); the multinational companies 
(IOCs) and some indigenous  companies found mainly in the service and downstream sectors [3]. 
Table 4: Production of Oil in Nigeria: 1980-2011 
Year Production % Change 
1980 2,055.00 NA 
1981 1,433.00 -30.27 
1982 1,295.00 -9.63 
1983 1,241.00 -4.17 
1984 1,388.00 11.85 
1985 1,495.00 7.71 
1986 1,467.00 -1.87 
1987 1,341.00 -8.59 
1988 1,450.00 8.13 
1989 1,716.00 18.34 
1990 1,810.00 5.48 
1991 1,891.80 4.52 
1992 1,943.00 2.71 
1993 1,960.00 0.87 
1994 1,930.90 -1.48 
1995 1,992.75 3.20 
1996 2,000.53 0.39 
1997 2,132.45 6.59 
1998 2,153.46 0.99 
1999 2,129.86 -1.10 
2000 2,165.00 1.65 
2001 2,256.16 4.21 
2002 2,117.86 -6.13 
2003 2,275.00 7.42 
2004 2,328.96 2.37 
2005 2,627.44 12.82 
2006 2,439.86 -7.14 
2007 2,349.64 -3.70 
2008 2,165.44 -7.84 
2009 2,208.31 1.98 
2010 2,455.26 11.18 
2011 2,525.29 2.85 
Source:Authors’ Compilation from [8] 
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In 2011, Nigeria produced about 2.53 million barrel per day (bbl/d) of total liquids, well below its production 
capacity of 3million barrels due to production disruptions that have compromised portions if the country’s oil 
for years. However, due to the federal government amnesty programmes Oil productions have increased as 
depicted in Figure 2 below. 
Figure 2: Trend Analysis of Nigerian Production 
 
Source:Authors’ Compilation from [8] 
 
2.2.2 Industry Fiscal System 
There are two main types of fiscal regimes existing in Nigeria today. Concessionary arrangements according to 
[11] dominated the Nigerian oil industry. Thus, Nigeria fiscal regime consists of Joint-Venture Contracts, 
production Sharing Contracts and Service contracts derived from the Petroleum Profits Tax Act of 1959, cap 
354 laws of the federation of Nigeria (LFN) 1990; although there have been changes made of the various 
regimes throughout the years. This arrangement saw the government granted a pure 80 year concession to Shell 
D’Arcy (later Shell BP) in the 1930s although there was a tweak of this concession when it pertained to Agip in 
1962 as it involved government’s equity participation in the company upon the discovery of oil. 
However from 1970s following the nationalization policy OPEC and the establishment of Nigerian National Oil 
Corporation (NNOC) in 1972 later revised as Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC),  International 
Oil Corporations (IOCs) operating in Nigeria did so under a Joint Operating Agreement where government 
acquired participating interest in the IOCs’ operation in the country, usually 60%; this stipulates that the 
government contributes its share of funds usually called ‘calls’ to the general operations to meet high capital 
costs. The JOA became the dominant arrangement in the country’s petroleum system since it was established up 
until the early 20th century when Production Sharing contract was introduced as the government could not meet 
up with its calls due to “pressured on its financial resources from other competing areas of the economy” [11].  
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The PSCs covers the deep offshore areas and the inland basin with the deep offshore and inland basin 
production sharing contracts decree no. 9 of 1999 providing the principal framework for the use of PSCs in the 
country. The government under this arrangement do not have any funding obligations as the oil companies are 
responsible for upstream oil activities. 
Table 5: Key Features of Fiscal Regime for Nigeria 
Fiscal Indicator Fiscal Agreement 
Bonuses Signature Bonuses: 
Offshore 
Up to 200ms $10m 
Up to 500ms $20m 
Up to 800ms $25m 
Up to 1000ms and beyond $20m 
Production Bonuses: 
At 500mm bbls 0.2% of price; at 100mm bbls 0.1% 
of price 
Royalties Water depth dependent  
<100ms: 18.5% 
Up to 200ms: 16.67% 
Up to 500ms: 12%  
Up to 800ms: 8%  
Up to 1000ms: 4% 
Deep Offshore: 0% 
State Participation (the maximum equity share the 
state can take) 
Variable 
Cost Of Recovery Current Experising Of Exploration And/Or 
Development Costs With Provision For Tax Credits 
Duty Exemption For Imports Of Equipment And 
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Capital Goods 
Tax Allowance 50% Credit In Capex For Pre-1998 Contracts 
50% Allowance On Capex For Post-1998 Contracts 
Income Tax Petroleum Profit Tax Of 50%, 85% 
Profit Oil Profit Oil Split To Government 
Additional oil entitlement 20% at 350mm bbls 
35% at 750mm bbls 
45% at 1000mm bbls 
50% at 1500mm bbls 
60% at 2000mm bbls 
Over 2000mm bbls (Negoatiable) 
Average Government Take 64%-70% 
Source: Culled from [11] 
The Nigerian PSC models features a range of royalties, bonuses and taxes. Under the PSC, a non-refundable 
signature bonus is payable on the oil prospecting license. The oil companies, fund the operations from 
exploration to production and the profits are shared as agreed under a memorandum of understanding after 
deducting companies’ expenses. 
Table 5 shows that in Nigeria signature and production bonuses are water depth dependent which also applies to 
royalties. On the issue of participation Nigeria has participation varies widely between agreements; the income 
tax rate for Nigeria varies between 50% and 85%. For PSC before 2005 profit oil share in Nigeria is based on 
cumulative production with government share ranging from a minimum 20% to 60%. After 2005 Nigeria’s oil 
share was based on Rate of Return (ROR). Government take for Nigeria is one of the heist in SSA with a take of 
64-70%. 
2.3 Indonesia 
2.3.1 Overview and Oil and Gas Industry 
Republic of Indonesia is a country in Southeast Asia and Oceania [5].  The country shares land borders with 
neighbouring countries of Papua New Guinea, East Timor and Malaysia. The Indonesian economy is the 16th 
largest in the world by nominal gross Domestic Product. Indonesia production and exploration activities is 
mainly carries out in the basins of western Indonesia basically in offshore and onshore of  two (2) states: Central 
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Sumatra and East Kalimantan. Indonesia holds proven oil reserves of 4.2 barrels and ranks 21st among the 
world’s oil producers.  
Year Production % Change 
1980 1,577.00 NA 
1981 1,605.00 1.78 
1982 1,339.00 -16.57 
1983 1,343.00 0.30 
1984 1,412.00 5.14 
1985 1,325.00 -6.16 
1986 1,390.00 4.91 
1987 1,343.00 -3.38 
1988 1,342.00 -0.07 
1989 1,409.00 4.99 
1990 1,462.00 3.76 
1991 1,592.00 8.89 
1992 1,504.00 -5.53 
1993 1,511.38 0.49 
1994 1,510.20 -0.08 
1995 1,502.69 -0.50 
1996 1,547.49 2.98 
1997 1,520.00 -1.78 
1998 1,518.36 -0.11 
1999 1,472.00 -3.05 
2000 1,428.38 -2.96 
2001 1,340.00 -6.19 
2002 1,249.03 -6.79 
2003 1,155.37 -7.50 
2004 1,095.64 -5.17 
2005 1,066.75 -2.64 
2006 1,019.22 -4.46 
2007 963.21 -5.50 
2008 986.05 2.37 
2009 969.08 -1.72 
2010 953.15 -1.64 
2011 896.21 -5.97 
Table 6: Production of Oil in Indonesia: 1980-2011 
Source: Authors’ Compilation from [8] 
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Figure 3: Trend Analysis of Indoesian Production 
 
Source:Authors’ Compilation from [8] 
However, in the last decades declining oil production basically as a result of natural maturation and slower 
reserve replacement and increased consumption resulted in the country becoming a net importer in late 2004. 
This single factor, along with high price of oil between 2004 and 2008, led the government to sustainably scale 
back the domestic fuel subsidy in 2008 and decide to withdraw temporarily from the OPEC. During 2010, 
Indonesia crude oil production was 0.945 million barrels per day, a drop of 33 percent since 2000. As the only 
Asian member of OPEC since 1962, the government country has indicated it will continue with OPEC only if it 
could increase its oil reserve and become a net exporter again. 
2.3.2 Petroleum Fiscal Systems 
Indonesia was the first country to create and adopt Production Sharing contract for its oil and gas exploration 
since 1970s; although there have been revisions but the PSCs still dominate many of the features of its fiscal 
systems. In 2006, the government of Indonesian introduced the Indonesian PSC 2006 which is governed by the 
1960 Regulation on the Mining of Mineral Oil and Gas which includes 1989 and 1992 incentives [9]. 
In this system that state oil corporation PERTAMINA can elect to repay the contractor by cash or from 50% of 
its production share with a 50% uplift applied to carried cost. Signature bonuses normally differ from one 
contractor to another subjected to negotiation. The first Tranche Petroleum (FTP) act as a royalty and 
BPMIGAS is entitled to 10% of its gross production. Contractor after tax equity split is 35% for oil and 40% 
goes to gas. 100% of production available after FTP is used for cost recovery. Bonuses are not cost recoverable 
[9]. However, operating costs and intangibles are expensed. Based production remaining after FTP and cost 
recovery, profit is shared between the government and contractor by the Before Tax Equity split for each 
product. The national oil company has an obligation to sell the oil into domestic market with the price below the 
market. This is known as Domestic Market Obligation (DMO). Obligation starts 5 years from production start of 
each field. Income tax is calculated based on the revenue from the contractor share of FTP, the cost recovery 
and the contractor profit oil. Operating costs, capital expenditures and bonuses are deductible from taxable 
income. The effective tax rate is 44% and losses are carried forward indefinitely [9]. 
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3. Comparative Analysis of Upstream Petroleum Fiscal Systems of Nigeria, Indonesia and Malaysia 
Figure 4: Comparative Analysis of Malaysian, Nigerian and Indonesian Production 
 
Source:Authors’ Compilation from [8] 
A look at the figure 4 above shows that in the past three years Nigeria’s oil production has declined consistently. 
Production in Indonesia has been relatively constant while Malaysia’s production has falling drastically possibly 
reflecting the maturity of the basins where production occurs. 
3.1 Fiscal Systems Comparisons 
Table 7: Fiscal Regimes of three Countries 
Type Nigeria Malaysia Indonesia 
Fiscal 
Arrangement 
PSC PSC PSC 
Royalty 20% Onshore 
16.7% Deep 
10% (85/15 Split) 20% FTP 
Cost Recovery 
Limit 
100% 70% 80% (Under Review) 
State Share Of 
Profit Petroleum 
20-60% (Avg. 
50%) 
Avg. 60% (Negotiable) Avg. 65% (Negotiable) 
Petroleum Tax 
Rate 
50% 38% 40% (Combined C&D Rate) 
Source: [9]; Authors’ Compilation 
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4.  Summary, Implications and Conclusion 
The aim of this paper is to compare fiscal regimes and how three oil exporting countries manage oil and gas 
resources through their fiscal regimes mechanisms. The three countries compared all adopt the Petroleum 
Sharing Contractual Fiscal system although with varying degrees of percentages across the classes of taxes. 
However, on the whole considering that a fiscal system is such that gives adequate compensation to host 
government while also encouraging investors to invest; it is recommended the two Asian countries should focus 
on investing in exploration of more reserves while Nigerian concentrates not only in amassing revenue but 
regime should focus on the part of the investors as well and building trust with oil communities. 
The study concludes that every country no matter the fiscal regime adopted has a unique situation which may be 
addressed by the operators. The comparative analysis of fiscal system has frequently met with the difficulty of 
finding information on respective legislation. On the whole, regional countries have no transparency on their 
fiscal systems. This may remain a duty for further and ongoing studies. Further studies on the fluid type will 
also be relevant for the government and contractors in order to have a win-win solution. 
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